Police Independence and the Military Police by Roach, Kent
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 49, Number 1 (Summer 2011) Article 4
Police Independence and the Military Police
Kent Roach
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Roach, Kent. "Police Independence and the Military Police." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49.1 (2011) : 117-149.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol49/iss1/4
Police Independence and the Military Police
Abstract
This article examines police independence in the context of the military police. The author concludes that the
independence of the military police to investigate both Criminal Code and Code of Service Discipline
offences should be recognized as part of the unwritten constitutional principle associated with the rule of law
and as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. The author examines the increased
recognition of the importance of police investigative independence since the Somalia Inquiry, including the
recent expansion of the command authority of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal over all military police.
The relation between police independence and the rule of law is discussed. The author notes that while the
military command structure has a legitimate interest in providing general and public policy guidance to the
military police, clause 18.5131 of Bill C-15-which has been introduced but not enacted in Parliament-would
violate police independence by enabling the Vice Chair of Defence Staff to issue instructions to the military
police in specific cases. Such interference with the investigative independence of the military police would be
inconsistent with increased post-Somalia recognition of the importance of police independence and could
undermine the application of the rule of law to the Canadian military.
Keywords
Canada--Armed forces--Military police; Police power; Rule of law; Law enforcement; Canada
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol49/iss1/4
117
Police Independence and the
Military Police
KENT ROACH *
This article examines police independence in the context of the military police. The author
concludes that the independence of the military police to investigate both Criminal Code and
Code of Service Discipline offences should be recognized as part of the unwritten constitutional
principle associated with the rule of taw and as a principle of fundamental justice under
section 7 of the Charter. The author examines the increased recognition of the importance of
police investigative independence since the Somalia Inquiry, including the recent expansion
of the command authority of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal over all military police.
The relation between police independence and the rule of taw is discussed. The author notes
that while the military command structure has a legitimate interest in providing general and
public policy guidance to the military police, clause 18.5131 of Bill C-15-which has been
introduced but not enacted in Partiament-would violate police independence by enabling
the Vice Chair of Defence Staff to issue instructions to the military police in specific cases.
Such interference with the investigative independence of the military police would be inconsis-
tent with increased post-Somalia recognition of the importance of police independence and
could undermine the application of the rule of law to the Canadian military.
Cet article examine 'indpendance de [a police dans le contexte de La police militaire. Lauteur
conclut que t'ind~pendance de ta police militaire pour ce qui est de mener des enqu~tes sur
les infractions au Code criminel et au Code de discipline militaire devrait 6tre reconnue dans le
cadre du principe constitutionnet non 6crit associ6 6 [a r~gLe de droit et en rant que principe de
justice fondamentaLe conform6ment 6 ['article 7 de [a Charte. Lauteur examine [a reconnais-
sance accrue de limportance de l'ind~pendance de [a police en mati~re d'enqu~tes depuis
t'enqu~te sur ta Somalie, qui comprend La r~cente expansion de t'autorit6 de commander du
Grand Pr6v6t des Forces canadiennes sur ta totalit6 de La police militaire. La relation entre
L'ind6pendance de ta police et La supr~matie du droit est abord6e. Lauteur fait remarquer
que, bien que La structure du commandement mititaire ait un int6r~t l.gitime 6 fournir une
Professor of Law and Prichard-Wilson Chair of Law and Public Policy, University of Toronto.
I thank the Military Police Complaints Commission, which commissioned the research on
which this article was based, while noting that the views expressed in this article are only my
own and do not necessarily represent those of the Commission. I also thank two anonymous
referees and my colleague Marty Friedland for challenging but helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
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orientation g6n6rale et publique 6 La police militaire, L'article 18.5(3) du projet de loi C 15 - qui
a t6 d~pos6, mais non promulgu6 au Partlement - enfreindrait L'ind~pendance de La police
en permettant au sous-directeur d'6tat-major de la Dfense d'6mettre des instructions 6 [a
police militaire dans des cas particulie-s. Une tette interf6rence avec l'ind6pendance de [a
police militaire en mati&re d'enqu~tes serait incompatible avec La reconnaissance accrue
ult6rieure 6 [a Somatie de t'importance de t'ind~pendance de La police, et pourrait saper
[application de La r~gle de droit aux militaires canadiens.
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THE CONCEPT OF POLICE INDEPENDENCE from government is complex and
involves what has been referred to as a "delicate balance."' On the one hand, the
rule of law would be offended and there would be a danger of creating a police state
ifa police officer could be instructed that he or she must or must not investigate or
lay charges against a particular person. Such interference with police investigations
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. On the other hand, the
1. Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry: Policy Analysis, vol 2 (Toronto: Government of Ontario,
2007) at 303 [Ipperwash Inquiry].
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police-like other governmental actors-must be accountable to superiors and
ultimately responsible to the people through the responsible ministers. The vital
importance of police independence from interference in individual investigations
must be weighed against the ability of the government to provide general policy
direction to the police and to ensure accountability for police conduct.
Although police independence is a nuanced subject at the best of times, it
is even more complex when applied to military policing.2 The Somalia Inquiry'
revealed how the rule of law-the principle that the law applies equally to all,
including those in the military-can suffer when the military obligation to
respect the chain of command overwhelms the military police's law enforcement
duty to investigate fully and impartially misconduct within the military. Similar
concerns have recently been raised concerning the role of the military police with
respect to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Forces to Afghan
authorities for possible torture. At the other extreme, complete independence
of the military police from the chain of command would be inconsistent with
their military status and might undermine legitimate interests of the military
command and the responsible minister in providing general policy guidance to
the military police.
The military police have evolved considerably since the Somalia Inquiry, and
the trajectory of these developments so far has been towards stressing greater
independence for the law enforcement role of the military police. This evolution
has gone hand in hand with a greater recognition of legal norms, including those
involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,' in the Canadian
military. In 1998, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) and the Vice
Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) agreed to an accountability framework that allows
the VCDS to exercise management responsibilities over the military police while
at the same time not interfering with individual investigations. The 1998 amend-
ments of the National Defence Act' also recognized the importance of the military
police's independence by allowing individual members of the military police to
bring complaints of interference by other members of the military in investiga-
tions to the then newly created Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC).
2. Andrew Halpenny, "'The Governance of Military Police in Canada" (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall
LJ 1; Martin L Friedland, Controlling Misconduct in the Military: A Study Prepared for the
Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services, 1997).
3. For more information on the Somalia Affair and the Somalia Inquiry, see Part II(B), below.
4. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Charter].
5. RSC 1985, c N-5, s 250.19.
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The MPCC has considered a number of such complaints, and there is increas-
ing recognition of the importance of non-interference by the military chain of
command in military police investigations. On 1 April 2011, the Canadian Forces
announced that the military police will no longer be subject to command author-
ity when exercising military police functions. Rather, they will be subject to the
authority of the CFPM, who is the highest military police official in the military.6
This reform brings the situation of military police officers considerably closer
to that of individual civilian police officers, who are subject to a single chain
of command with the police chief at the apex of the command hierarchy.7 At
the same time, however, I will suggest that this recognition of military police
independence has been threatened by legislation introduced but not enacted
in the last Parliament-legislation that was reintroduced in Parliament as Bill
C-158 in fall 2011.
In the first Part of this article I will examine the scope and legal status of
police independence. In the second Part I will discuss the evolving nature of police
independence in relation to the military police. The military police context is an
excellent vehicle to explore and understand the rationales for police independence
because the stakes and competing factors are often magnified in the military
setting. For example, the events in Somalia underline how the need to apply the
rule of law to serious misconduct can be critical. However, the same military
setting also illustrates that complete independence of the police, both from the
command structure and ultimately from accountability to the government, is
impossible. In the third Part of this article I will assess the degree to which Bill
C- 15, which was introduced in Parliament in October 2011, is consistent with
military police independence. It will be suggested that the clauses of this Bill
that recognize the ability of the military command to provide general and public
guidelines to the military police strike an appropriate balance between police
independence and command responsibility. Other provisions that would allow
the military command to issue potentially confidential instructions in respect
of a particular investigation are, however, inconsistent with the investigative
independence of the military police.
6. National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "The Canadian Forces Military Police
Group," online: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.
asp?cat=03&id=2921> [Military Police Group].
7. Halpenny, supra note 2.
8. An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts,
1 st Sess, 41 st Parl, 2011 (first reading 7 October 2011) [Bill C- 151.
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I. POLICE INDEPENDENCE
Police independence is an evolving and somewhat controversial constitutional
concept. Philip Stenning concluded in 2000 that there is
very little clarity or consensus among politicians, senior RCMP officers, jurists (includ-
ing the Supreme Court of Canada), commissions of inquiry, academics, or other
commentators either about exactly what 'police independence' comprises or about
what its practical implications should be for the RCMP-government relations.
9
Support can be found in the jurisprudence for four very different models of
police-governmental relations: fill police independence; governmental policing;
core police independence over law enforcement decisions; and democratic
policing based on published directives from the government."
Although much has been written about the appropriate relationship between
police and government in the context of a variety of crises, less has been written
about the precise legal status and scope of police independence from government
more generally. Before the 1999 Supreme Court of Canada decision in
R v Campbell,1 many would have maintained that police independence was at
most a constitutional convention based on practice and principle. Constitutional
conventions are matters of wisdom, practice, and principle that constrain the
exercise of legal powers and are enforced by the relevant constitutional actors
but do not override or invalidate legal powers.12 However, there is a danger
that constitutional conventions are becoming somewhat quaint in the Charter
age, where the ultimate question tends to concern the legality, as opposed to the
wisdom or morality, of governmental action.13
As a result of the Campbell decision, police independence may be recognized
as a constitutional principle, rendering it more directly enforceable by the courts
than a constitutional convention. Campbell qualified the reference in the Royal
Canadian Mounted PoliceActU that the police, via a commissioner, are under the
direction of the minister at least with respect to core investigatory functions such
9. "Someone to Watch over Me: Government Supervision of the RCMP" in W Wesley Pue, ed,
Pepper in Our Eyes: The APECAffair (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) 87 at 113.
10. Kent Roach, "The Overview: Four Models of Police-Government Relations" in Margaret
E Beare & Tonita Murray, eds, Police and Government Relations.- Who's Calling the Shots?
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 16.
11. [1999] 1 SCR 565 [Campbell].
12. Reference Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [ 198 111 SCR 753 [Reference Re Constitution].
13. Peter H Russell & Lorne Sossin, eds, Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2009).
14. RSC 1985, c R-10, s 5(1).
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as the decision to investigate and lay a charge. There is a growing consensus in
Canada that at the core of police independence is the protection of police officers
from interference with law enforcement discretion relating to the investigation
and laying of charges.
A. EX PARTE BLACKBURN
The modern doctrine of police independence is generally traced to a 1968 British
common law case, R v Police Commissioner of the Metropolis Exparte Blackburn,
in which Lord Denning concluded that the commissioner of the London police,
"like every constable in the land," was and should be
independent of the executive. ... he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law
itself. No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep obser-
vation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that
one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement
lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.'
5
Lord Denning relied on a number of British civil liability cases in stressing
the independence of the police from the government. The Supreme Court of
Canada in a 1902 civil liability case, McCleave Estate v Moncton (City of), had
similarly decided that
[plolice officers can in no respect be regarded as agents or officers of the city. Their
duties are of a public nature. ... The detection and arrest of offenders, the preservation
of the public peace, the enforcement of the laws, and other similar powers and duties
with which police officers and constables are entrusted are derived from the law, and
not from the city or town under which they hold their appointment.
1
6
Similar British civil liability cases provided an awkward base for Lord Denning's
sweeping comments because they were not concerned with general constitutional
principles. Rather, they were concerned with the limited proposition that "there is
no master and servant relationship between constables and their employers in the
rather special sense which has been given that phrase in the law of torts.""
15. [1968] 2 QB 118 at 135-36 [Exparte Blackburn].
16. (1902), 32 SCR 106 at 108-09, quoting Buttrick v Lowell (City of), 1 Allen 172 (Mass
Sup Ct 1861). For an examination of other early Canadian civil liability jurisprudence,
see Philip C Stenning; Legal Status of the Police (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1982) at 102-12. Professor Stenning concludes that "[nione of these cases, however,
determines the implications of the constitutional status of the police in terms of their liability
to receive direction of any kind with respect to the performance of their duties" (ibid at 110).
17. Geoffrey Marshall, Police and Government: The Status and Accountability of the English
Constable (London: Menthuen, 1965) at 34. See also Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional
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B. R v CAMPBELL
The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Campbell involved two people, Campbell
and Shirose, who were charged with drug offences as.a result of a reverse sting
operation in which RCMP officers sold them drugs. The Crown sought to defend
the police conduct on the basis that the police were part of the Crown or were
agents of the Crown and thus were protected by the Crown's public interest
immunity. Justice Binnie for the unanimous Supreme Court emphatically
rejected such an argument on the basis that a "police officer investigating a crime
is not acting as a government functionary or as an agent of anybody. He or she
occupies a public office initially defined by the common law and subsequently
set out in various statutes. " "1
Justice Binnie emphasized that the court was "concerned only with the status
of an RCMP officer in the course of a criminal investigation, and in that regard
the police are independent of the control of the executive government" and "not
subject to political direction. Like every other police officer similarly engaged,
he is answerable to the law...."'19 He declared that this principle "underpins the
rule of law,"2" which the Court had elsewhere noted "is one of the 'fundamental and
organizing principles of the Constitution."'2 1 Notably, Justice Binnie's com-
ments about police independence in Campbell-like Lord Denning's comments
in Ex parte Blackburn-were technically obiter dicta and so not essential to
the resolution of the case. However, given the paucity of judicial authority on
police independence, they may be no less influential. The recognition of police
independence in this case was consistent with the rule of law by stressing that
the police did not enjoy a form of Crown immunity for their illegal actions.
However, Parliament responded to this decision by enacting legal authorization
for the police to engage in investigative conduct that would otherwise have
been illegal. 2
C. THE GROWING CONSENSUS ABOUT POLICE INDEPENDENCE
The Campbell decision has reinvigorated discussion of the doctrine of police
independence from government with respect to law enforcement matters. The
Conventions: The Rules and Forms ofPoliticalAccountability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) ch 8.
18. Campbell, supra note 11 at para 27.
19. Ibid at paras 29, 33.
20. Ibid at para 33.
21. Ibid at para 18, quoting Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at 240
[Secession Reference].
22. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 25.1.
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understanding of police independence demonstrated in this decision is consistent
with influential commentary by, commissions of inquiry both before and after it
was rendered.
In 1981, the McDonald Commission 23 concluded that
[t]he Minister should have no right of direction with respect to the exercise by the
R.C.M.P of the powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution. To that extent, and
to that extent only, should the English doctrine expounded in Exparte Blackburn be
made applicable to the R.C.M.P.
2 4
In other respects, the McDonald Commission defended ministerial control on
the basis of democratic principles, stressing that it was
axiomatic that in a democratic state the police must never be allowed to become a
law unto themselves. Just as our form of Constitution dictates that the armed forces
must be subject to civilian control, so too must police forces operate in obedience to
governments responsible to legislative bodies composed of elected representatives.
25
The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution concluded
in 1989 that "[i] nherent in the principle of police independence is the right of the
police to determine whether to commence an investigation." 26 In an appropriate
circumstance, the police should be prepared to lay a charge even if it was clear
that the Attorney General would refuse to prosecute the case. In the Royal
Commission's view, such an approach "ensures protection of the common law
position of police independence and acts as an essential check on the power of
the Crown."27 It found that the RCMP "failed in its obligation to be independent
and impartial"21 in its investigation of two Nova Scotia cabinet ministers and
that this reflected a "double standard" that "undermines public confidence in the
integrity of the system. ' 29
23. The McDonald Commission examined this issue in the course of investigating illegalities
committed by the RCMP's Security Service and recommending the creation of a new civilian
intelligence agency. Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, Freedom and Security Under the Law, vol 2 (Ottawa: Canadian
Government Publishing Centre, 1981).
24. Ibid at 1013.
25. Ibid at 1005-06.
26. This Commission examined police independence in the course of examining the
investigation of Donald Marshall, Jr. and two other individuals. Royal Commission on the
Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Findings and Recommendations, vol 1 (Halifax: Province of
Nova Scotia, 1989) at 232.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid at 213.
29. Ibidat 212-14, 216.
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In the 2001 interim report concerning complaints arising from the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference, Justice Hughes stressed that
"[w]hen the RCMP are performing law enforcement functions (investigation,
arrest and prosecution) they are entirely independent of the federal government
and answerable only to the law.""° In such circumstances, Justice Hughes recom-
mended, the RCMP should not submit themselves to governmental direction. At
the same time, when the RCMP are not performing the law enforcement functions
of investigation, arrest, and prosecution, Justice Hughes recognized that "they are
not entirely independent but are accountable to the federal government through"
the responsible minister.3 This statement is consistent with the findings of both
the McDonald Commission and the Marshall Commission, as well as with the
subsequent Campbell decision.
The Arar Commission32 concluded in 2006 that while
the outer limits of police independence continue to evolve ... its core meaning is
clear: the Government should not direct police investigations and law enforcement
decisions in the sense of ordering the police to investigate, arrest or charge-or not
to investigate, arrest or charge-any particular person.33
The Arar Commission went on to state that this principle is rooted in the rule
of law because "[i]f the Government could order the police to investigate, or not
to investigate, particular individuals, Canada would move towards becoming a
police state in which the Government could use the police to hurt its enemies
and protect its friends....,34
The Ipperwash Inquiry suggested in 2007 that, in light of Campbell, "the
government should not direct the police on specific law enforcement decisions,
30. The Commission examined police independence in the course of investigating a complaint
against policing of demonstrations. Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP,
Commission Interim Report: Following a Public Hearing into the Complaints Regarding the
Events that Took Place in Connection with Demonstrations During the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference in Vancouver, B.C. in November 1997 at the UBC Campus and at the
UBC and Richmond Detachments of the RCMP (Ottawa: Commission of Public Complaints,
2001) at 86.
31. Ibid.
32. The Commission examined police independence in the course of recommending a new
review mechanism for the RCMP's national security activities in light of the mistreatment
of Maher Arar. Commission of Inquiry into the Action of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006).
33. Ibidat 458.
34. Ibid.
126 (2011] 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
including who should be investigated, arrested, and/or charged." " It recom-
mended that Ontario policing legislation be amended to make clear that the
minister should not be able to give directions to the police about law
enforcement decisions in individual cases. At the same time, the Ipperwash
Inquiry defended a democratic model of police-government relations that would
allow the minister to provide published directives to the police on various policy
matters such as public order policing.3 6
The Air India Inquiry recognized the importance of police independence
when it proposed in 2010 that once the Prime Minister's National Security
Advisor decided to pass on information to the RCMP, he or she would have
"no ongoing role in the investigation. It is a police matter. The RCMP is duty
bound to conduct the investigation independent of any outside influence." "'
At the same time, the National Security Advisor could "have contact with the
RCMP about policy, dispute resolution or about general matters relating to the
effectiveness of operations...
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF POLICE INDEPENDENCE
Although there is growing consensus that police independence is limited to law
enforcement decisions, the exact constitutional status of the principle is not
completely clear. The Court in Campbell derived the principle of police inde-
pendence from the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which stresses the
importance of impartially applying the law to all and especially to those who hold
governmental power. The decision raises the possibility that courts might
enforce the principle of police independence as part of the unwritten constitutional
principle of the rule of law. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether a constitu-
tional principle can override clear legislation. At the same time, the constitutional
principle of police independence in the investigation and laying of charges may
inform the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter-which
35. The Inquiry examined police independence in the course of examining allegations of political
interference in the policing of Aboriginal demonstrations at Ipperwash Provincial Park and the
resulting death of Aboriginal protester Dudley George. Ipperwash Inquiry, supra note 1 at 318.
36. Ibid at 357. See recommendation 71.
37. The Air India Commission examined police independence in the course of its
recommendation that the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor be given enhanced
responsibilities in reviewing the exchange of information between the RCMP and the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the
Bombing of Air India Flight 182, Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy, vol 3 (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2010) at 40.
38. Ibid.
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can invalidate inconsistent legislation-and may also inform application of
abuse of process doctrine in individual cases.
E. POLICE INDEPENDENCE AS AN UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW
The principle of police independence in the investigation and laying of charges
is derived in Campbell from the constitutional principle of the rule of law. This
raises the question of the status of constitutional principles in Canadian law.
Traditionally, the Canadian Constitution has been divided between matters of
constitutional law and matters of constitutional convention. Constitutional law
includes the Constitution Act, 1867,"9 the Constitution Act, 1982,10 and the Charter.
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that "the constitution of
Canada is the supreme law of Canada" and that inconsistent laws are of no force
or effect to the extent of their inconsistency.41 Constitutional conventions are
commonly understood as principles that constrain the way that constitutional
actors exercise legal powers but that do not give courts the legal authority to
invalidate clear statutory powers. 2 Thus, constitutional principles seem to lie
somewhere between constitutional laws, which have clear overriding effect, and
constitutional conventions, which are matters of political practice and morality.
Campbellwas decided in the wake of previous Supreme Court decisions that
invoked unwritten constitutional principles in support of various findings. These
decisions included the determination that in order to respect the unwritten
principle of judicial independence, governments cannot negotiate salaries with
the judiciary 3 and the determination that the unwritten constitutional principles
of federalism, minority rights, and democracy should guide any decision involving
the secession of Quebec from Canada.4" In the 1997 Judges Remuneration Refer-
ence, the Court concluded that "the express provisions of the Constitution Act,
1867 and the Charter are not an exhaustive written code for the protection of
judicial independence in Canada. '1 5 Despite a strong dissent by Justice LaForest,
the Court looked to the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 as a source of
enforceable legal principle. It stressed that the constitutional principle of the rule
39. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
40. Supra note 4.
41. Ibid.
42. Reference Re Constitution, supra note 12.
43. Reference Re Remuneration ofJudges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3
SCR 3 [Judges Remuneration Reference].
44. Secession Reference, supra note 21.
45. Supra note 43 at para 109.
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of law had been used in the Manitoba Language Reference" to provide temporary
validity to laws that would otherwise have been struck down because they had
only been enacted in English. 7 This case established that the principle of the rule
of law thus has a constitutional status that can temporarily sustain unconstitutional
laws notwithstanding the clear wording of section 52(1) that they are of no force
and effect.
In 1998, the Court indicated in the Secession Reference that
underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to
substantive legal obligations ... which constitute substantial limitations upon
government action. These principles may give rise to very abstract and general
obligations, or they may be specific and precise in nature. The principles are not
merely descriptive, but also involve a more powerful normative force...
At the same time, the Court did not indicate that the judiciary should en-
force the unwritten constitutional principles at stake at the Secession Reference,
including democracy and the rule of law. Rather, the Court held that these
unwritten principles should guide political negotiations in the event of a clear
vote in Quebec supporting secession.
More recently, the Court's enthusiasm for recognizing unwritten constitu-
tional principles-let alone enforcing them-has waned. In 2005, the Court
rejected the idea that the rule of law requires that prospective legislation must
not target specific legal persons, namely tobacco companies. It reasoned "that in
a constitutional democracy such as ours, protection from legislation that some
might view as unjust or unfair properly lies not in the amorphous legal principles
of our Constitution, but in its text and the ballot box."' 9 The Court was unwilling
to enforce an understanding of the unwritten principle of the rule of law that
went beyond the text of the Charter and to apply unwritten principles based
on the rule of law against publicly debated and enacted legislation. This case is
particularly important in the context of police independence because it suggests
that courts may be reluctant to use the constitutional principles of police
independence and the rule of law to invalidate democratically enacted legislation.
Furthermore, in its 2007 decision in British Columbia (AG) v Christie, the
Court favoured the more restrictive text of the Charter over the idea that access
46. Reference re Language Rights Under s 23 ofManitoba Act, 1870 and s 133 of Constitution Act,
1867, [19851 1 SCR 721 [Manitoba Language Reference].
47. Ibidat para 99.
48. Supra note 21 at para 54. See generally Robin Elliot, "References, Structural Argumentation
and the Organizing Principles of Canada's Constitution" (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 67.
49. British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] 2 SCR 473 at para 66.
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to legal services is part of the rule of law."0 In that decision, it rejected the idea
that general access to legal services was an unwritten constitutional principle that
followed from the application of the principle of the rule of law. Instead, the
Court defined the components of the rule of law as embracing at least three
principles: (1) "that the 'law is supreme over officials of the government as well as
private individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power"';
(2) a requirement of "'...the creation and maintenance of an actual order of
positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of
normative order"'; and (3) a requirement that "'the relationship between the state
and the individual ... be regulated by law."'' The Court thus provided content to
the rule of law principle without clarifying its precise status or its enforceability
by the courts.
Interference with police independence with respect to the investigation and
laying of charges could offend the rule of law principle as defined in Christie if it
resulted in the law not being supreme over all persons, including governmental
officials. In such circumstances, the most basic relationship between the
individual and the state might be governed by the arbitrary exercise of power by
those who interfered in police investigations as opposed to the impartial appli-
cation of the law. 52 In extreme situations, such as the events that gave rise to the
Somalia Inquiry or the possible transfer of detainees to torture in Afghanistan,
a refusal to allow the military police to investigate allegations of serious crime
might even produce a lawless situation that lacks normative order. Thus, police
independence may be necessary to respect the rule of law. Accordingly, courts
may be willing to enforce a constitutional principle of police independence in
a more direct and substantive manner than simply declaring its existence as a
constitutional convention.
There are, however, some pragmatic considerations that might render courts
reluctant to enforce police independence in this fashion-that is, to promote
police independence as an unwritten constitutional principle based on the rule of
50. [2007] 1 SCR 873 [Christie]. See also Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
[20071 1 SCR 350 at paras 133-37 (also rejecting the idea that an appeal or a rule against
automatic detention was part of the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law).
See also Babcock v Canada (AG), [2002] 3 SCR 3 (rejecting the proposition that the rule of
law invalidated s 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, which confers evidentiary
privilege upon Cabinet confidences).
51. Christie, supra note 50 at para 20, quoting Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 46 at
paras 59-60 and Secession Reference, supra note 21 at para 71.
52. The Court has stressed that the unwritten principle of judicial independence protects-judges
from arbitrary and discretionary removal from office. See Ell v Alberta, [2003] 1 SCR 857.
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law so as to invalidate legislation that clearly restricts police independence. One
concern is simply the lack of precedent or legal authority. The courts have never,
in a published decision, applied unwritten constitutional principles to invalidate
legislation. In the Judges Remuneration Reference, mentioned earlier in this Part,
the Court appealed to unwritten constitutional principles but ultimately based
its ruling that laws reducing judicial salaries were unconstitutional on the fact
that they constituted an unjustified violation of section 11 (d) of the Charter.3
Although interference with police' independence might violate the unwritten
constitutional principle of the rule of law, it is unclear whether the courts would
invalidate democratically enacted legislation that authorized such interference
solely on this basis. This makes it very important that Parliament not enact such
laws. As will be seen in Part III of this article, certain clauses of Bill C-15-if
enacted-would do just that by authorizing the military command to interfere
with individual military police investigations.
F. POLICE INDEPENDENCE AS A POSSIBLE PRINCIPLE OF
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
Even if courts will not enforce the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule
of law to invalidate democratically enacted legislation, concerns about the rule of
law will likely inform their interpretation of section 7 of the Charter. A principle
of fundamental justice, to be recognized as such within the meaning of that
section, must be (1) a legal principle that is (2) generally accepted as fundamental
to the way a legal system ought to operate fairly and is (3) capable of being
applied with precisionY' Although the Court has rejected both harm and best
interests of children 6 as principles of fundamental justice, it might hold that
police independence as recognized in Campbell is a principle of fundamental jus-
tice. In contrast to these more controversial policy matters, police independence is
a legal principle rooted in concerns about the rule of law. As discussed above in Part
I(C), there is a growing consensus about the core meaning of police independence
with respect to law enforcement discretion in investigation, arrest, or prosecution.
Police independence with respect to such matters could be said to be an integral
part of any fair legal system. Finally, Campbell demonstrates that police indepen-
dence can be defined with precision when it relates to unauthorized interference in
police decisions about whether to investigate, arrest, or charge a person.
53. Supra note 43.
54. R v DB, [2008] 2 SCR 3 at para 46.
55. R v Malmo-Levine-, R v Caine, [2003] 3 SCR 571.
56. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (AG), [2004] 1 SCR 76.
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However, even if police independence is held to be a principle of fundamental
justice, section 7 of the Charter does not protect principles of fundamental justice
in the abstract. There must be a violation of life, liberty, or security of the person.
If a person faced a criminal prosecution as a result of improper interference
with police independence, then it should be relatively easy to establish that the
prosecution threatened the person's liberty and/or security of the person. As will
be discussed below, in Part I(G), such a prosecution might also constitute an
abuse of process. It would be more difficult to demonstrate a violation of rights
to life, liberty, or security of the person in cases where, for example, interference
with police independence prevented a full police investigation from taking place
and consequently prevented prosecution. In some extreme cases, however, the
absence of a full police investigation of a serious crime might threaten the rights
of crime victims to life and security of the person. 7 Unfortunately, victims of
such interference with police independence might have difficulty gaining knowl-
edge about secret acts of interference and therefore be unable to establish that
their section 7 rights were in fact violated.
G. POLICE INDEPENDENCE AS A BASIS FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS
DOCTRINE
Even if courts were reluctant to constitutionalize police independence under
section 7 of the Charter or to enforce it as an unwritten constitutional prin-
ciple, they should be more willing to allow police independence to inform the
enforcement of their jurisdiction to protect judicial processes from abuse. The
Supreme Court has recognized that courts have a residual discretion under
both the common law and section 7 of the Charter to stay proceedings on
the basis of abuse of process. Here, abuse of processes is defined as abuse that
will be perpetuated by the conduct of the trial or that cannot otherwise be rem-
edied.58 A prosecution that was tainted by improper interference with a police
investigation might qualify as an abuse of.process. However, this doctrine would
57. There is little direct authority for recognizing the rights of crime victims under the Charter.
The Court has recognized that refugee applicants' right to life may be threatened even
though the Canadian state would not persecute them. See Singh v Minister of Employment
and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177. The Court has also recognized that court processes
may. affect the rights of victims to privacy and security of the person under s 7. See R v
Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668. More recently, a lower court has held that legislation concerning
prostitution is unconstitutional because it forces prostitutes to work in dangerous
environments. See Bedfordv Canada (AG) (2010), 102 OR (3d) 321 (Sup Ct).
58. R v Regan, [2002] 1 SCR 297.
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not be able to remedy interference with police investigations that precluded the
police from conducting a full investigation, making an arrest, or laying a charge.
In such circumstances, the only available constitutional remedy would be
declaratory relief or damages under section 24(1) on the basis that the interference
with the police investigation violated the section 7 Charter rights of the victim of
an uninvestigated crime. Executive foreclosure or truncation of police indepen-
dence will be less transparent than executive direction of a police investigation,
and the difficulty of applying the Charter or abuse of process doctrine to such
actions underlines the limits of the legal enforcement of police independence. As
I will argue in Part III of this article, police independence needs to be internalized
as an administrative matter in both police and government.
H. SUMMARY
Investigative police independence was recognized in Campbell as part of the
unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law. There is a consensus
among Canadian commissions of inquiry that police independence in these
core law enforcement decisions should be protected from political direction,
even though governments have legitimate powers to provide general guidelines
to the police. Even if courts hesitate to apply unwritten constitutional princi-
ples to invalidate democratically enacted legislation that authorizes interference
with police independence, police independence might be indirectly enforced
under section 7 of the Charter or under the abuse of process doctrine. However,
such enforcement might be more difficult in cases such as the Somalia Affair,
where interference with police independence prevented a full investigation
culminating in charges.
II. POLICE INDEPENDENCE AND THE MILITARY POLICE
The military police are both police officers charged with enforcing the law and
members of the military. The balance defining the military police's dual status
is best understood in historical context. There has been an evolving recognition
of police independence in the military, especially since the Somalia Inquiry, 9
which culminated in the April 2011 expansion of the jurisdiction of the CFPM
to include command of all military police when they exercise military policing
duties. This increased recognition of military police independence is, however,
vulnerable to legislative incursion, particularly if the courts are unwilling to
.59. For more detail see Halpenny, supra note 2.
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enforce police independence as a constitutional principle that can invalidate
democratically enacted legislation.
A. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE
In certain circumstances, the military police have peace officer status under the
Criminal Code. In R v Nolan,6" the Supreme Court ruled that a military police
officer is a peace officer under section 2(g)(ii) of the Criminal Code when making
a breathalyzer demand to a civilian stopped on a public highway in relation to a
breach of traffic regulations on an armed forces base. To the extent that military
police exercise peace officer powers under the Criminal Code, there is no reason
to think that police independence, as articulated in Campbell, would not apply
to them.
The military police also exercise law enforcement powers such as detention
and arrest with respect to military personnel who are subject to the Code of
Service Discipline "regardless of the person's rank or status... ."I' The Code of
Service Discipline is set out in the National Defence Act. Although many of its
offences relate to specific matters of military discipline such as insubordination,
disgraceful conduct, malingering, and drunkenness, many other offences overlap
with Criminal Code offences. Indeed, section 130 of the National Defence Act
makes it a service offence to commit acts or omissions either in or outside of
Canada that would be punishable under the Criminal Code or any other Act of
Parliament.62 The maximum penalty for Code of Service Discipline offences is
life imprisonment.63 This suggests that Code of Service Discipline offences are
serious matters and that the military police should enjoy independence when
investigating them.
However, under articles 107.02 and 107.12 of the Queen's Regulations and
Ordersfor the Canadian Forces,64 commanding officers have powers to lay charges
for Code of Service Discipline offences and to decide against proceeding with
such charges. These provisions might support an argument that the military
police should not enjoy police independence because Code of Service Discipline
offences are ultimately matters of military discipline and subject to the chain of
command. However, the power of the commanding officers is exercised after the
60. [19871 1 SCR 1212.
61. National Defence Act, supra note 5, s 156(a).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid, s 139.
64. Online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces ,<http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qro-
orf/vol-02/doc/chapter-chapitre-107.pdf>.
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military police have conducted a full investigation free from chain of command
influence." Comparably, the civilian police enjoy independence even though
their rights to lay charges are sometimes restricted by statutory requirements for
the consent of the Attorney General and by administrative pre-charge screening
practices. 'The fact that civilian police officers are not always free to, lay charges
does not take away from their claims to independence from interference in law
enforcement decisions. Full police investigations will allow for better accountability
in decisions not to proceed with charges regardless of whether these decisions are
made by Crown attorneys in the civilian system or by commanding officers in
the military system. Indeed, full and unfettered investigations are arguably more
critical in the military system, where decisions of whom to charge are made by
those who, unlike Crown attorneys, may have incentives not to enforce the law
fully because of the embarrassment, discredit, and disgrace that full enforcement
might bring upon the military.
As a practical matter, it would be difficult to bifurcate the independence of
the military police and claim that the military police only enjoy independence
when enforcing the Criminal Code. At the start of an investigation, especially
one involving allegation of serious misconduct, it may not be possible to know
whether the matter will be handled as a Code of Service Discipline offence or as
a Criminal Code matter. Section 250.19 of the National Defence Act, as added
in 1998 in response to the Somalia Affair, provides statutory recognition of
police independence by allowing complaints to be made to the Military Police
Complaints Commission (MPCC) for all interferences with military police
investigations regardless of whether they relate to the Criminal Code or to the
Code of Service Discipline. It would be very difficult for the military police to
accept interference in their investigations with respect to Code of Service
Discipline offences but to resist it with respect to Criminal Code offences. In
extreme combat situations, the rule of law still requires a full police investigation
even if a commanding officer ultimately decides that a prosecution for a Code
65. See Military Police Polices and Technical Procedures A-SJ-100--004/AG-OOO, ch 2, para 79
[on file with author]. It is particularly important in this regard in providing,
Except for technical police duties or functions, the MP personnel are subject to orders and
instructions issued by their respective Commanders or on their behalf. Nevertheless, com-
manders may not direct specific investigative or law enforcement action. This is a mandate and
responsibility of the CFPM and the MP technical net.
These policies and procedures are being revised in light of the command changes for military
police announced on 1 April 2011 (see Military Police Group, supra note 6), but they still
reflect a recognition of police investigative independence.
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of Service Discipline offence is not warranted given the difficult circumstances
faced by the military The investigative independence of the military police is an
indivisible good.
B. THE SOMALIA INQUIRY AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE MILITARY POLICE
The Somalia Inquiry found that the lack of military police independence was
a deficiency in the conduct of the Armed Forces in Somalia in 1992 and 1993.
It found sixty-two incidents during the 1993 Canadian mission in Somalia
that should have been investigated by the military police but were not. These
incidents included "allegations of serious criminal or disciplinary misconduct,
such as mistreatment of detainees, killing of Somalis, theft of public property,
and self-inflicted gunshot wounds."66 Some of the incidents, including the
death of Shidane Arone, were subject to summary investigations by members
of the military who were not military police. The Somalia Commission of
Inquiry found that these investigations were tainted by conflict of interest. It
concluded that
commanding officers can exert tremendous influence over investigations because
Military Police fall within the chain of command. That influence may be intentional
or unintentional, but it can affect the scope of an investigation and the resources
available to carry it out. ... [A] commanding officer might be tempted to hinder ...
a broad investigation if it might cast the commander, the commanding officer, the
unit, or the [Canadian Forces] in a bad light.67
The inquiry stressed that commanding officers had their own interests in not
pursuing possible misconduct. Also, commanding officers were not peace officers
and so were "not subject to a peace officer's oath of office or code of conduct, and
ha[d] no overriding obligation to advance the administration of justice."6 8 It also
observed that
Military Police are part of the chain of command. They take orders from their
commanding officers about which incidents to investigate, and their chances for
promotion are affected by their commanding officer's assessment of them. This
makes it difficult for MP to treat their superiors as ordinary witnesses or suspects.
69
66. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured
Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, vol 5 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 1997) at 1263 [Somalia Inquiry].
67. Ibid at 1272.
68. Ibid at 1284.
69. Ibidat 1271.
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Furthermore, the Somalia Inquiry found a "soldier first"7 attitude among
the military police:
In essence, Military Police investigate only to the point of satisfying the commanding
officer. This poorly serves the needs of the military justice system, for the system in
fact needs investigations that will support convictions, not simply satisfy
commanding officers. At the same time, setting the commanding officer's satisfaction
as the benchmark for deciding whether an investigation has been adequate fosters
an environment ripe for command influence.
71
The Somalia Inquiry recommended that "Military Police be independent of
the chain of command when investigating major disciplinary and criminal
misconduct."72 To promote military police independence, it recommended the
appointment of a Director of Military Policing. It warned, however, that "total
independence can never be 'guaranteed as long as Military Police are members
of the CF [Canadian Forces]; they will always face a subtle pressure to consider
the impact of an investigation on the CF."73 It proposed that prosecutors-not
the military police-lay charges, in part because of a lack of tradition of military
police independence. It made this recommendation in 1997, before the Supreme
Court's decision in Campbell, which included the laying of charges within police
investigative independence.
C. THE DICKSON REPORTS
In addition to the Somalia Inquiry, the Minister of Defence asked retired Chief
Justice Brian Dickson to examine various matters concerning the military
police and military justice. In its first report in 1997, the Dickson Committee
distinguished the "field and garrison duties" of the military police-which "are
essentially of a military nature" and as such subject to "the established chain of
command"-from their investigative responsibilities, "which are almost wholly of
a policing nature."7 The latter should result in discretion to lay charges and involve
a duty to report "independently of the chain of command" under the new po-
sition of Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM), who would function as the
chief military police officer.75 Like the Somalia Inquiry, the Dickson Committee
70. Ibid at 1285.
71. Ibidat 1286.
72. Ibid at 1296.
73. Ibid at 1297.
74. Report of the SpecialAdvisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services
(Ottawa: Ministry of National Defence, 1997) at ii.
75. Ibid.
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warned that the power of commanding officers over the military police could
compromise the investigative independence of the military police. It concluded
that "for matters that are sensitive or of serious criminal nature, it is imperative
that the investigation be conducted independendy of the chain of command. This
should include the final decision of whether or not to lay a charge. 76 In this
respect, the Dickson Committee embraced a more robust vision of military
police independence than even the Somalia Inquiry; unlike the Somalia Inquiry,
the Dickson Committee's vision of police independence included the ability of the
military police to lay charges free of interference. This approach is consistent with
the subsequent Campbell decision.
A 1998 follow-up report after Chief Justice Dickson's death disagreed with
a proposal that the CFPM, as the effective Chief of the Military Police, should
assume the command of all military police except those on field duties or
deployment.77 It noted the importance of base-wing military police being subject
to the operational chain of command. It also pointed out that such military
police would, under the 1998 amendments of the National Defence Act, be able
to report interference with military police investigations to the newly created
MPCC.7" Andrew Halpenny has criticized the Dickson Committee approach
for subjecting the military police to "many masters"79 and noted that 90 per
cent of military police were subject to operational commands.8" As will be seen,
command structure should change with the April 2011 increases in the command
authority of the CFPM to include all military police exercising military policing
duties. In fact, the military has now embraced a more robust administrative opera-
tionalization of police independence than contemplated by the Dickson task force.
D. THE 1998 ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE VCDS AND
THE CFPM
The 1998 Dickson Committee Report also approved of a 1998 Accountability
Framework that was "meant to ensure that the reporting relationship of the
[Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM)] to the [Vice Chief of Defence Staff
(VCDS)] does not in any way compromise the independence of the CFPM in
relation to the investigatory role of the military police... ."" To this end, the
76. Ibid at 36.
77. Report of the Military Police Services Review Group (Ottawa: Ministry of National Defence,
1998) at 30 [1998 Dickson Committee Report].
78. Ibid at 12.
79. Supra note 2 at 44.
80. Ibid at 47.
81. Supra note 77 at 14.
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Accountability Framework contemplated that while the VCDS would establish
"general priorities and objectives for military police services" and be responsible
for "general administrative and financial control," the VCDS would "have no
direct involvement in individual ongoing investigations but will receive information
from the CFPM to allow necessary management decision making."82 As will be
discussed below in Part III, this latter provision would be statutorily abrogated
by a controversial part of Bill C- 15.
Although the 1998 Accountability Framework was formulated a year before
Campbell, it was broadly consistent with the understanding of police indepen-
dence in that decision. Consistent with Campbell, the Accountability Framework
ensured that the VCDS, who is not a peace officer, will not have direct involve-
ment in individual ongoing investigations. The 1998 Accountability Framework
also recognized the legitimate management and policy oversight responsibilities
of the VCDS and the need for the CFPM to provide the VCDS with information
necessary to allow the discharge of those management responsibilities.
E.. THE 1998 AMENDMENTS AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE CONCEPT OF
IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATIONS
Increased recognition of the investigative independence of the military police was
also supported by the 1998 enactment of section 250.19 of the National Defence
Act, which allows the military police to complain to the newly created MPCC
about improper interference with an investigation. In 2002, the then chair of the
MPCC, Louise Cobetto, issued a paper that concluded that
the Military Police, when performing its law enforcement duties, is completely inde-
pendent of the non-military police chain of command and the government. When the
Military Police perform non-military police duties, it is not completely independent,
but it reports to the federal government through the Chief of the Defence Staff.83
82. Ibidat 15 [emphasis added], quoting Accountability Framework of 2 March 1998 signed by
VCDS GL Garnett and CFPM Samson (found in ibid, Annex B). The commentary to the
Accountability Framework elaborated on these matters by providing,
The VCDS will give general direction to the CFPM and monitor and review program activity,
however, the day to day direction of individual investigations rests with the CFPM. The CFPM
has a duty to advise the VCDS on emerging and pressing issues where management decisions
are required. However, the degree of detail provided on the day to day investigations rests within
the discretion of the CFPM in keeping with the respective roles, responsibilities, and principles
enunciated in this document.... The CFPM will monitor individual investigations and provide a
general overview of investigations to the VCDS. Discussions with the VCDS of specific details of
any investigation are to be avoided unless specific circumstances warrant attention of management.
83. Interference with Military Police Invtstigations: What is it About? (Ottawa: Military Police
Complaints Commission, 2002) at 13.
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Now, when deciding interference complaints, the MPCC can develop a nuanced
jurisprudence about the exact scope of military police independence. The MPCC's
jurisdiction to consider interference complaints might, however, be truncated
should the National Defence Act be amended to authorize command direction and
interference in military police investigations as proposed in Bill C-15.
F. THE 2011 INCREASES IN THE COMMAND AUTHORITY OF THE CFPM
Until recent changes announced by the military in April 2011, most members of
the military police were subject to chain of command in their particular division
of the military. One exception was the Canadian Forces National Investigation
Service, which investigates the most serious and sensitive offences, but they only
constitute about 10 per cent of the military police.84 Halpenny observed in 2010
that this state of affairs made it difficult to transfer independence concepts taken
from civilian policing to the military police, in part because the military police
have many potential commanders-including high ranking base and wing
commanders-whereas the civilian police are all subject to direction by a single
chief of police.8" Halpenny recommended that this situation be rectified by placing
all military police under the command of the CFPM. As discussed above, this kind
of proposal had previously been rejected by the Dickson Committee as discounting
the need for the military police to function within their particular garrison. Never-
theless, the suggestions were accepted by the military in 2011 when it announced
that the military police will no longer be subject to command authority within
their environmental (army, navy, or air force) or operational command divisions
when exercising military police functions. Rather, they will be subject to the
authority, of the CFPM in much the same way as individual police officers are
subject to the command of their police chief8 6 This change, combined with the
1998 Accountability Framework and recognition of a complaint mechanism for
claims of interference with military police investigations, highlights the growing
acceptance that the military police should enjoy police independence when they
investigate Criminal Code and Code of Service Discipline offences.
G. SUMMARY
The concept of police independence has increasingly been applied to the military
police and should be applied to military police investigations of potential violations
84. Halpenny, supra note 2 at 44-45, 47.
85. Ibid at 44.
86. National Defence, Backgrounders, "The Canadian Forces Military Police Group," online:
<http: www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=03&id=29 2 1 >.
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of both the Criminal Code and Code of Service Discipline. The Somalia Inquiry
demonstrated the serious dangers of allowing chain of command interference
with military police investigations. Both the 1998 Accountability Framework
and the 1998 enactment of section 250.19 of the National DefenceAct recognized
military police independence, the former by prohibiting chain of command
direction in individual investigations and the latter by recognizing that the
military police could complain to the MPCC about interference by the chain
of command. No distinctions in the need for military police independence were
made between Criminal Code and Code of Service Discipline matters; such
distinctions would be unworkable in practice given the extensive overlap between
the Criminal Code and the Code of Service Discipline and the need for police
independence in all investigations. In April 2011, the military increased its
commitment to police independence by placing all military police exercising
police functions under the command of the CFPM as opposed to under their
base or wing command.
III. BILL C-15 AND POLICE INDEPENDENCE
Bill C-15, as introduced in Parliament in October 2011, provided for many
amendments to the National Defence Act. The focus here will be on amendments
that relate to the military police and how they could impact police independence.
The most relevant provisions of Bill C-15 are as follows:
18.5 (1) The Provost Marshal acts under the general supervision of the Vice Chief of the
Defence Staff in respect of the responsibilities described in paragraphs 18.4(a) to (a).
(2) The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff may issue general instructions or guidelines
in writing in respect of the responsibilities described in .paragraphs 18.4(a) to (a).
-he Provost Marshal shall ensure that they are available to the public.
(3) The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff may issue instructions or guidelines in
writing in respect of a particular investigation.
(4) The Provost Marshal shall ensure that instructions and guidelines issued under
subsection (3) are available to the public.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply in respect of an instruction or guideline, or of a
part of one, if the Provost Marshal considers that it would not be in the best interests
of the administration of justice for the instruction or guideline, or that part of it, to
be available to the public.
8 7
87. Supra note 8.
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It will be suggested below that clause 18.5(3) infringes police independence.
Unfortunately, it was not deleted in the amendments proposed by the Standing
Committee on National Defence in late March 2011 and was reintroduced
without change as part of Bill C- 15 in October.
A. STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF THE CFPM
Responding to recommendations made by the late ChiefJustice Antonio Lamer,"8
Bill C- 15 proposes to recognize the position of CFPM in the National Defence
Act. Clause 18.3(3) of the Bill would provide for the appointment of a CFPM,
who would hold office during good behaviour for a renewable four-year term
and could only be removed for cause on the recommendation of an inquiry.
The protections in clause 18.3 for the CFPM are more substantial than those
provided for the commissioner of the RCMP or other police chiefs. This may
well be appropriate given the influence of rank in the military and the fact that
the CFPM will be outranked by others in the military structure, including the
VCDS. 9 Clause 18.3 advances the idea that military police should enjoy some
degree of 'independence from others who may outrank them in the military
command structure.
B. RECONCILING POLICE INDEPENDENCE WITH MANAGEMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES: GENERAL SUPERVISION AND PUBLIC
INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDELINES FROM THE VCDS TO THE CFPM
Clause 18.5(1) of Bill C-15 would recognize that the CFPM "acts under the
general supervision" of the VCDS and clause 18,5(2) would provide that the
VCDS may issue "general instructions or guidelines" about how the CFPM
exercises his or her general responsibilities. Clause 18.5(2) would ensure the
transparency of any "general instructions" by requiring the CFPM to ensure
that all general guidelines "are available to the public." This recognition of the
management responsibilities of the military as represented by the VCDS is
consistent with the 1998 Accountability Framework, which contemplates that
the VCDS will have "general administrative and financial control" and can
88. The First Independent Review by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer PC, CC, CD. of the
provisions and operation of Bill C-25, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make
consequential amendments to other Acts as required under section 96 of Statutes of Canada
1998, c35 (submitted to the Minister of National Defence, 3 September 2003) at 75, online:
<http://www.cfgb-cgfc.gc.ca/documents/LamerReport-e.pdf>.
89. Bill C-15, supra note 8, c1 18.3(2) (providing that the CFPM should hold the rank of at
least a colonel).
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establish general priorities and objectives for the military police. 9 This structure
is consistent with civilian policing practices, where the police cannot be totally
independent from management and policy direction by the government.
Clause 18.5(2) is generally compatible with the recommendations made by
the Ipperwash Inquiry that favoured a "democratic policing" model that would
allow the responsible minister to issue general policy directives to the police,
provided those directives are public.91 In the context of military policing, the
analogue to democratic accountability through the responsible minister or police
board is the management roles of the Chief of Defence Staff and the VCDS.92
C. CLAUSE 18.5(31 AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE VCDS TO THE
CFPM IN RESPECT OF PARTICULAR INVESTIGATIONS
If Bill C-15 had ended at clauses 18.5(1) and (2), it would have been consistent
with military police investigative independence. Indeed, it would have provided
a sound statutory framework for reconciling competing interests in investigative
or law enforcement independence with the need to ensure that the military
police are subject to general policy and management direction by the military, as
represented by the VCDS.
Unfortunately, clause 18.5(3) of Bill C- 15 would go beyond the ability of the
VCDS to provide "general supervision, instructions or guidelines" to the CFPM
and would empower the VCDS to "issue instructions or guidelines in writing in
respect of a particular investigation."93 Moreover, clause 18.5(5) would open the
possibility that such instructions not always be made public. Clause 18.5(3) of
Bill C-15 is contrary to paragraph 7(A) of the 1998 Accountability Framework,
which provided that "the VCDS will have no direct involvement in individual
ongoing investigations but will receive information from the CFPM to allow
necessary management decision making."9 4 If enacted, clause 18.5(3) would
90. 1998 Dickson Committee Report, supra note 77, Annex B.
91. Ipperwash Inquiry, supra note 1, ch 12.
92. Andrew Halpenny has suggested, that a Military Police Service Board be created and that it,
rather than the VCDS, should provide policy guidance to the military liolice through the
CFPM. See Halpenny, supra note 2 at 50-52. However, such an innovation was not announced
as part of the April 2011 reforms. One concern with Halpenny's suggestion is that such a board
would further insulate the Minister of Defence from ultimate accountability for the military
(including the military police) and would further diffuse accountability. The Ipperwash Inquiry
considered but ultimately did not recommend the creation of a province-wide police services
board for the Ontario Provincial Police. See !pperwash Inquiry, supra note 1 at 351-55.
93. Bill C-15, supra note 8, cls 18.5(1), (3).
94. 1998 Dickson Committee Report, supra note 77 at 15, quoting 1998 Accountability Framework
of 2 March 1998 signed by VCDS GL Garnett and CFPM Samson (found in ibid, Annex B).
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displace the non-statutory Accountability Framework. Moreover, clause 18.5(3)
is inconsistent with the core tenet of police independence recognized in Campbell
because it would give a very high-ranking member of the military explicit
statutory powers to interfere in a police investigation by issuing instructions in
respect of a particular investigation. For example, clause 18.5(3) would allow the
VCDS to give instructions not to investigate a particular person or matter or
to investigate a particular person or matter in a specified way. In making such
instructions, the VCDS could be motivated by a desire to protect the reputation,
standing, and funding of the military. The VCDS would be acting not as a peace
officer but as the second highest-ranking member of the Canadian Forces. The
rule of law could potentially suffer from the absence of a full and impartial inves-
tigation by the military police.
Clause 18.5(3) does apply some restrictions on interference by the chain
of command on police investigations. Specific instructions about a particular
investigation to the investigating military police officer must come from the
VCDS and not from the investigating officer's immediate superior. Indeed,
restrictions on immediate command interference with the military police have
been strengthened by the April 2011 announcement that the CFPM will assume
command over all military police. The proposed powers in clause 18.3(3) only
reside in the VCDS, and they cannot be delegated to base or wing military
commanders.
Although the VCDS has a legitimate management interest in issuing general
guidelines and instructions to the CFPM, it is difficult to understand why this
power should extend to individual cases. Although it is possible that a policy matter
may emerge for the first time in the context of a specific investigation, there is
a danger that the VCDS's instructions in a specific case may not necessarily
be related to general policy or managerial matters, but rather may constitute
an arbitrary interference in a particular investigation. The fact that the VCDS's
instructions in specific cases, as opposed to his or her general instructions,
may not necessarily be made public also increases the danger that the VCDS's
interventions will be perceived as arbitrary interferences with police investigative
independence. It is also troubling that the proposed legislation would abrogate one
of the 1998 Accountability Framework's important restrictions, which dictated
that the VCDS have no direct involvement in individual ongoing investigations."
As discussed above, the 1998 Accountability Framework was approved by the
Dickson Committee report and is consistent with the subsequent 1999 decision
in Campbell, which recognized police investigative independence as an unwritten
95. Ibid.
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constitutional principle derived from the rule of law. There is no public evidence
that the balance set in the 1998 Accountability Framework is flawed. Nonetheless,
clause 18.5(3) would be a step backward in the recognition of police independence,
even while the proposed statutory recognition of the role of the CFPM in Bill
C- 15 and the April 2011 increase in the CFPM's command authority to all military
police are significant steps forward in this regard.
The rationale for clause 18.5(3) is unclear, especially given its incongruence
with the 1998 Accountability Framework and the military's willingness in April
2011 to dramatically expand the CFPM's command authority to all military
police. Clause 18.5(3) in some respects mimics clause 165.17(3) of the National
Defence Act as amended in 1998, which contemplates that the Judge Advocate
General may issue not only general instructions and guidelines to the director of
military prosecutions, but may also issue them "in writing in respect of a particu-
lar prosecution."" The difference, however, is that the Judge Advocate General
would issue instructions and guidelines with respect to a particular case in his
or her capacity as a legal officer with responsibilities for the administration of
military justice and not as part of the overall military chain of command. Clause
18.5(3) of Bill C-15 is very different because it has the potential to allow the
second highest-ranking officer in the Canadian Forces to shut down or to direct
a military police investigation.
The best possible rationale for clause 18.5(3) would be an argument that
the VCDS's legitimate policy interests should not be restricted to issuing general
and prospective guidelines and instructions because policy issues can crystallize
in an individual investigation. There is some support for this idea in the
McDonald Commission, which stressed the need for the responsible minister
to be informed of operations even in individual cases because they may raise
important policy or operations issues. Yet even the McDonald Commission did
not go as far as clause 18.5(3) because it concluded that "the Minister should
have no right of direction with respect to the exercise by the R.C.M.P. of the
powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution."" This statement, made in 1981,
has been supported by the subsequent recognition of police law enforcement
and investigative discretion as a constitutional principle in Campbell. The condusion
now seems inescapable that even when an investigation raises policy issues, the
military police should be allowed to proceed with their investigation without
96. Supra note 5, s 165.17(1).
97. Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, Freedom and Security Under the Law, vol 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1981) at 1013.
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interference from non-military police command structures-including the'
VCDS. Command influence may play a role with respect to the laying of service
discipline charges, but it should not affect the military police investigation in a
specific case. Policy issues may result in the VCDS articulating general guide-
lines and instructions under clause 18.5(2) to guide future investigations. At the
same time, allowing these policy issues to be resolved in real time in the form
of instructions pertaining to specific investigations presents considerable risk of
undermining police investigative independence.
D. REFORM OPTIONS
What should be done about clause 18.5(3)? In my view, the best course would be
to delete this clause and the related clauses 18.5(4) and (5). As suggested above,
the remaining clauses provide a sound statutory framework to reconcile the
competing demands of police independence and accountability. Unfortunately,
the Standing Committee on National Defence did not make this simple reform
when it reported on Bill C-41 to the House of Commons in March 2011. The
Committee made only a bare-bones report that did not address this issue,98 despite
submissions made on this issue by the Military Police Complaints Commission,
which expressed concerns about the adverse effects of clause 18.5(3) on the
independence of the military police.9
It is not advisable to amend clause 18.5(3) to restrict the ability of the VCDS
to provide instructions in specific cases to those investigations proceeding under the
Code of Service Discipline as opposed to those under the Criminal Code. As sug-
gested above, there is overlap between the more serious Code of Service Discipline
offences and the Criminal Code. There is a public interest in full investigations of
Code of Service Discipline offences even if, in the final analysis, a decision is made
by commanding officers not to prosecute them. Another option would be to amend
clause 18.5(3) so that it only applies in minor cases. I do not think this is appropri-
ate since the Code of Service Discipline runs the gamut from very serious Criminal
Code offences to relatively minor matters of military discipline and management. It
is also very unlikely that the VCDS would take an interest in minor matters.
98. House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, Report 7: Bill C-41, An Act
to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts (March
2011) (Chair: Maxime Bernier).
99. Submission by Military Police Complaints Commission to Standing National
Defence Committee (31 January 2011), online: <http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/alt-
format/i 100/1 103-eng.pdf>; Supplementary Submission by Military Police Complaints
Commission to Standing National Defence Committee (16 February 2011), online:
<http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/altformat/I 100/1 104-eng.pdf> [Supplementary Submission].
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The transparency of clause 18.5(3) could be increased by requiring that any
specific instruction be made public. In some respects, this would follow the model
used in Director ofPublic Prosecutions Act, including the federal procedure when the
Attorney General issues instructions to the Director of Public Prosecutions.',
Although such an amendment would increase transparency, it would also invite
legal challenges on abuse of process and section 7 Charter grounds in individual
cases for which the VCDS issued instructions and if those investigations result in
prosecution. The analogy with the model adopted by the Attorney General and
Director of Public Prosecution is also misplaced because, even when the Attorney
General intervenes in an individual case, he or she does so as a law officer of the
Crown °1 whereas, as already noted, the VCDS would be intervening in a military
police investigation as the second highest-ranking official in the military, who
might have an interest-or be perceived by the public as having an interest-in
stopping investigations of embarrassing misconduct and crime in the military.
E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLAUSE 18.5(31 BECOMING LAW
The refusal of the Standing Committee on National Defence to amend or delete
clause 18.5(3) meant that this provision is again found in Bill C-15, reintrodu'ced
in October 2011. From a policy perspective, the enactment of clause 18.5(3)
would harm post-Somalia Affair developments, which have increasingly
recognized the investigative independence of the military police. If enacted, clause
18.5(3) would place the CFPM in a difficult-if not impossible-position. As
a member of the military, the CFPM would have to accept specific instructions
from the VCDS, the second highest-ranking member of the military. As a police
officer, however, the CFPM should not follow instructions that conflict with
police investigative independence or, at the very least, should respond to such
instructions by making an interference complaint to the MPCC.
The MPCC would also be placed in a difficult-if not impossible-position
should clause 18.5(3) become law. On the one hand, the MPCC would continue
to have a responsibility under section 250.19 of the National Defence Act to hear
complaints of command interference with military policing. On the other hand,
the MPCC would have to reconcile this jurisdiction with clause 18.5(3), which
would clearly authorize the VCDS to issue instructions and potentially inter-
100. Director of Public Prosecutions Act, s 10, being Part III, s 121 of the FederalAccountability Act,
SC 2006, c 9.
101. See generally J LIJ Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown: A Study of the Offices ofAttorney-
General and Solicitor-General of England with an Account of the Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions of England (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964) chs 10-11.
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fere in individual investigations. The MPCC has indicated that it would "read
down" its jurisdiction over interference complaints to exclude instructions from the
VCDS that are specifically authorized in legislation." 2 However, even if the MPCC
changed its mind and found that police independence should prevail, the Chief of
Defence Staff-who ultimately must respond and decide whether to implement
MPCC recommendations on an interference complaint-may take a different
view of the matter and rely on the statutory authorization for specific instructions.
There is a possibility that clause 18.5(3), if enacted, might be found to be
inconsistent with the unwritten constitutional principle of police independence
recognized in Campbell. As I discussed in Part I of this article, it is not clear
whether the courts would strike down democratically enacted legislation on the
basis of an unwritten constitutional principle. Even if the courts were not prepared
to do so, they might invalidate instructions issued under clause 18.5(3) that they
find to be an arbitrary interference with the principle of police independence as
expressed in Campbell. There is also a possibility that clause 18.5(3) might violate
section 7 of the Charter if, as discussed in Part 1, police independence were accepted
as a principle of fundamental justice and if a particular interference with police
independence violated rights to life, liberty, or security of the person.
Furthermore, courts might find a prosecution resulting from specific
instructions under clause 18.5(3) to be an abuse of process because of executive
interference with police investigations. Such litigation, however, may be practically
difficult because interference by the VCDS in military police investigations is
more likely to result in curtailed investigations that do not result in charges as
opposed to charges that can be challenged by the accused on constitutional or
abuse of process grounds. Although political interference that results in charges is
possible, it is telling that the mischief in the Somalia Affair comprised incidents
of misconduct that were not independently investigated by the police.
Ex post constitutional and abuse of process remedies after the enactment of
clause 18.5(3) are possible but far from ideal The best arguments against clause
18.5(3) are based not on uncertain predictions about whether the provision would
survive a legal challenge or interference complaint, but on a recognition that the
provision is unwise, unnecessary, and inconsistent with widely accepted under-
standings of police independence that have increasingly been applied to the military
police since the Somalia Affair. The mere possibility of legislatively sanctioned mili-
tary command direction of individual investigations may erode confidence in the
investigative independence of the military police. It would be an unnecessary step
backwards.
102. Supplementary Submission, supra note 99 at 2.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Police independence is sometimes seen as an obscure subject that is only discussed
at times of crisis and controversy, following incidents such as the Somalia Affair or
the shooting of Aboriginal protester Dudley George.- The findings of the Somalia
Inquiry, as well as allegations of interference with the discretion of the military
police pertaining to Afghan detainees, underline the dramatic consequences
of interference with the independence of military police investigations. In
recognition of the importance of this investigative independence, in 1998 the
federal government allowed military police to make interference complaints.
Canada also signed an agreement that recognized that while the VCDS has a
legitimate management and policy interest in providing general guidelines to the
military police, the VCDS, as the second highest-ranking officer in the Canadian
military, should not provide instructions that would interfere with individual
military police investigations.
In many ways, Bill C-15, if enacted, would continue the healthy trend
toward increased recognition of military police investigative independence. It
would acknowledge and protect the important role of the CFPM as the de facto
military police chief-an office that has become more significant given the April
2011 expansion of the CFPM's command to all military police. Bill C-15 would
also recognize that the independence of the military police is not absolute and
that the VCDS can continue to issue general and public 'guidelines to the CFPM.
Unfortunately, Bill C- 15 also proposes to give the VCDS statutory authority
to provide instructions to the CFPM on the conduct of specific investigations
without even the guarantee that such instructions will be made public. If
enacted, these powers would constitute a step backwards in the recognition of the
investigative independence of the military police. The result would be a statutory
abrogation of the 1998 Accountability Framework, which recognizes that the
VCDS's legitimate management responsibilities should not involve instructions
in individual cases-a change that, if realized, would constitute a serious incursion
into the core constitutional principle of police independence as recognized by
Campbell. If Parliament proceeds in this way, ex post facto constitutional and
abuse of process remedies may be sought, and the MPCC may receive increased
interference complaints and will have to reconcile its jurisdiction to hear such
complaints with specific statutory authorization of interference by the VCDS in
specific military police investigations.
Such after-the-fact, remedies should not, however, be made necessary; clause
18.5(3) is clearly problematic for the investigative independence of the military
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police and serves no compelling policy objective that could not otherwise be
accomplished by the VCDS's ability to issue general and transparent guidelines
to the CFPM. If enacted, clause 18.5(3) will re-open a door that was rightly
shut after the Somalia Affair.

